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GOVERNMENT RECOVERY OF MEDICARE 
OVERPAYMENTS AND THE AUTOMATIC STAY 
ABSTRACT 
The automatic stay in bankruptcy is in place to protect the debtor’s fresh 
start and discourage creditors from pursuing their own collection efforts outside 
of the equitable distribution bankruptcy contemplates. In healthcare 
bankruptcies, the automatic stay is not always applied consistently, especially 
for the largest creditor in these cases, the government.  
The government, through its agencies, decides whether it will require the 
bankrupt healthcare provider to repay any Medicare overpayments the agency 
has previously made. During bankruptcy and the automatic stay, government 
agencies continue to demand and collect repayments from healthcare entities, 
allowing the government to jump other creditors based on the equitable doctrine 
of recoupment.  
Recoupment is a non-statutory doctrine recognized by bankruptcy courts as 
a means for creditors to offset their debts against payments, but recoupment is 
similar to setoff, an action that is stayed under the Bankruptcy Code. This 
Comment argues that government agencies should not be allowed to continue 
repayment actions against healthcare entities that will jeopardize their 
reorganization process during bankruptcy. This Comment suggests that courts 
can fix this issue by narrowly applying the doctrine of recoupment and reducing 
the circumstances in which government agencies can collect from bankrupt 
healthcare entities without seeking relief from the automatic stay. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) was 
passed with the goal of decreasing healthcare costs and increasing the quality of 
patient care.1 The ACA is the most comprehensive healthcare law passed in 
recent times, making health law one of the fastest-growing fields in the legal 
profession. Many people understand the new healthcare reforms affecting 
individuals, such as the individual mandate and preexisting condition 
limitations. However, most people are unaware of the greater impact that the 
ACA and other federal healthcare regulations have on healthcare providers and 
their ability to deliver services and conduct business.  
Since the passage of the ACA, healthcare entities have been subject to 
numerous new regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and 
Human Services (“HHS”).2 Some of these regulations closely monitor the 
quality of care the public receives by requiring healthcare providers to report 
quality and readmission rates to determine “winners and losers” in the healthcare 
system.3 When healthcare providers report these factors, patients can make more 
informed decisions about their providers, and the government can determine 
which entities are efficiently spending government funds.4  
In this “winner-loser” system, more healthcare entities will be pushed into 
bankruptcy by consumers or the government.5 When healthcare entities file for 
bankruptcy, they will likely find that the goals of bankruptcy and healthcare 
regulations frequently clash.6 Although healthcare regulations seek to provide 
efficient health services to citizens, a goal of bankruptcy is to reorganize 
businesses to allow for creditor recovery on debts.7 A common issue that could 
have a drastic effect on healthcare entities is receiving necessary Medicare 
payments from the government during bankruptcy. The Medicare system 
operates by estimating the amount of reimbursement the healthcare provider 
 
 1 See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012). 
 2 See ABI HEALTH CARE INSOLVENCY MANUAL 11 (Leslie Ann Berkoff, Bobby Guy, Timothy Lupinacci 
& Clifford Zucker eds., 3d ed. 2012). 
 3 See Symposium, Corporate Bankruptcy Panel–The Healthcare Industry Post-Affordable Care Act: A 
Bankruptcy Perspective, 31 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249, 252 (2015); Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, Linking Quality to Payment, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/linking-
quality-to-payment.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
 4 See Linking Quality to Payment, supra note 3. 
 5 See Symposium, supra note 3, at 252. 
 6 See Deryck A. Palmer & Michele J. Meises, Collision Course between Bankruptcy and Health Care 
Laws: Which Will Ultimately Control?, 1999 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW 1. 
 7 See id.  
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should receive from servicing Medicare recipients.8 This estimation process 
often leads to overpayments that the government must recover from the 
provider.9 When a healthcare entity files for bankruptcy, HHS’s Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) frequently argues that it may 
continue to seek repayments from healthcare entities for the excess funds it 
provided prior to the bankruptcy.10 Healthcare providers question whether these 
recovery actions are violations of the automatic stay under § 362 of the 
Bankruptcy Code (the Code).11 
Alternatively, CMS utilizes the non-statutory doctrine of recoupment as a 
permissible way to recover debts from future payments. Because courts allow 
recoupment of debts made during the same transaction as an equitable remedy, 
CMS regularly argues that recovery of Medicare overpayments during 
bankruptcy does not violate the automatic stay.12 However, Medicare payments 
are vital to the survival of the majority of healthcare providers.13 Taking 
prepetition payments back from these providers after they filed for bankruptcy 
strips them of assets needed for reorganization, and even forces some hospitals 
to close their doors.14 Unfortunately, courts have yet to resolve whether the 
automatic stay applies to these recovery actions by the government.15  
The split in judicial opinions hinges on whether Medicare payments and 
Medicare overpayment recovery actions are considered to be within the “same 
transaction.”16 If overpayment recovery actions are considered separate 
transactions from Medicare payments, CMS’s recovery actions fall under the 
definition of setoff and are subject to the automatic stay.17 On the other hand, if 
Medicare payments and overpayment recovery efforts are considered to be 
 
 8 ABI, supra note 2, at 14–15; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395g (2012). 
 9 See ABI, supra note 2, at 15. 
 10 See Palmer, supra note 6. 
 11 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012); see Palmer, supra note 6. 
 12 See Palmer, supra note 6. 
 13 See U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Medicare Pays Almost Half of Rural Hospital Stays: AHRQ 
News and Numbers, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY (Jan. 28, 2010), https://archive. 
ahrq.gov/news/newsroom/news-and-numbers/012810.html. 
 14 See, e.g., Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re Univ. Med. Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1071 (3d Cir. 1992); In 
re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC, 525 B.R. 160, 164 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014); In re Tidewater Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 
106 B.R. 876, 879 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989). 
 15 See Ted A. Berkowitz & Veronique A. Urban, Medicare Issues in Bankruptcies, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. 
J. 28 (2012). 
 16 See, e.g., In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 17 11 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); see In re LaPierre, 180 B.R. 95, 100 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994) (stating that 
recovery efforts for obligations arising out of separate transactions are considered setoff and subject to the 
provisions of the automatic stay). 
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within the same transaction, the equitable doctrine of recoupment allows 
overpayment recovery without implicating the automatic stay.18 Five federal 
circuits and several bankruptcy courts have addressed this specific issue by 
analyzing the “same transaction” distinction.19  
When courts determine that the government’s post-petition recovery efforts 
should be exempt from the automatic stay solely based on their understanding 
of “same transaction,” courts are ignoring the unique nature of the healthcare 
industry and its regulatory system. In contrast, the minority view implements a 
test that considers other factors relevant to the rules of construction and public 
policy when determining the appropriate definition of “same transaction”: the 
“single integrated transaction test.” In turn, this Comment proposes that courts 
adopt the minority approach by utilizing the single integrated transaction test 
and considering the public policy issues that specifically affect healthcare 
providers. 
First, this Comment will  discuss the conflicting provisions of Medicare law 
and bankruptcy law that courts must resolve. Next, this Comment will compare 
the tests that circuits have used to resolve the issue of Medicare overpayment 
recovery within bankruptcy. Finally, this Comment will advocate for the 
minority approach to this issue by highlighting the appropriateness of limiting 
the equitable doctrine of recoupment, looking to CMS’s accounting practices to 
evaluate separate transactions, and considering the public policy implications 
for healthcare providers in bankruptcy. 
BACKGROUND 
In general, conflicts occur when the government attempts to regulate the 
healthcare system in the United States.20 Healthcare laws and regulations seek 
to protect the public health by providing efficient services, but also regulate the 
costs and availability of services for all Americans.21 The conflicting policies in 
health law are of particular concern when a healthcare organization files for 
bankruptcy.22 While one goal of bankruptcy is to allow equitable recovery for 
 
 18 See In re LaPierre, 180 B.R. at 100. 
 19 See, e.g., In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1072; United States v. Consumer Health Servs. of Am., 
Inc., 108 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1997); In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d at 1011; In re Holyoke Nursing Home, 
Inc., 372 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2004); In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d 98, 104 (1st Cir. 2005); see also 
Berkowitz, supra note 15. 
 20 See ABI, supra note 2, at 3.  
 21 See id. 
 22 See id.  
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creditors, another goal is to provide the debtor with a fresh start.23 Chapter 11 of 
the Code provides entities with the opportunity to cure their financial issues 
while staying in business by reorganizing the business and debts.24 The conflict 
between health law and bankruptcy is heightened when the government operates 
as both a regulator of the public health system and a creditor within the 
bankruptcy system. 
A. Medicare 
As one of the largest national healthcare programs, Medicare laws and 
regulations will frequently affect healthcare entities inside and outside of 
bankruptcy.25 Title XVIII of the Social Security Act established the Medicare 
program to provide health insurance coverage for the elderly.26 Medicare 
provides this benefit by paying the cost of certain health services for eligible 
citizens.27 Under the Medicare system, healthcare entities enter into “provider 
agreements” with Medicare’s administrating agency, CMS, to be reimbursed for 
the cost of services rendered to Medicare-covered patients.28 The provider 
agreements require healthcare entities to agree to certain terms and abide by 
regulations as a condition of participating in the Medicare program.29 CMS 
employs a prospective payment system (“PPS”) as a method to reimburse 
entities prior to incurring the costs for their services.30 Under the PPS, CMS 
estimates the costs the healthcare provider will incur based on predetermined 
amounts for various types of entities.31  
 
 23 See W. HOMER DRAKE & CHRISTOPHER S. STRICKLAND, CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATIONS § 1.1 (2d ed. 
2017). 
 24 See id.  
 25 Harvey L. McCormick, 1 MEDICARE AND MEDICAID CLAIMS AND PROC. § 1:1 (4th ed.). 
 26 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012); 6 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKR. L. 
& PRAC. § 119:5 (3d ed. 2008). 
 27 Medicare covers people ages 65 and over, people under age 65 with certain disabilities, and people of 
all ages with End-Stage Renal Disease. Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Program - 
General Information, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-General-Information/Medicare 
GenInfo/index.html (last modified July 25, 2014). Also, certain individuals may be subject to other eligibility 
requirements depending on whether they are covered under Part A, B, C, or D. Health services covered depend 
on whether the individual is under Part A, B, C, or D. See ABI, supra note 2, at 3.  
 28 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare General Information, Eligibility, and 
Entitlement § 10.1 CMS.GOV (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/ 
Manuals/downloads/ge101c05.pdf; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395g (2012). 
 29 Eligibility and Entitlement, supra note 28.  
 30 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Prospective Payment Systems – General Information, 
CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-payment/prospmedicarefeesvcpmtgen/ 
index.html (last modified May 19, 2015). 
 31 42 C.F.R. § 413.64 (2017); Prospective Payment Systems, supra note 30. 
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Since these payments are based on estimates, CMS must reconcile the 
payments with the actual amount due to the provider from actual services 
rendered and costs accumulated at the end of the accounting period.32 If CMS 
determines there has been an overpayment, a fiscal intermediary, acting on 
behalf of CMS, sends out an initial demand letter to the provider notifying them 
of the overpayment and requesting repayment or offering the option to enter into 
a repayment arrangement with reduced or suspended future payments.33 If the 
provider does not respond to the demand letter within 15 days, the fiscal 
intermediary may begin subtracting the amount owed from current or future 
payments to providers.34  
In the alternative, the provider may appeal the overpayment demand or 
request that recovery be waived.35 This response may temporarily pause the 
recovery process pending the determination of the appeal or waiver.36 The 
appeals process consists of five levels of review, beginning with redetermination 
by the fiscal intermediary up to judicial review by a federal district court.37 This 
lengthy process can lead to years of appeals, and burdens the provider to produce 
evidence at each stage.38 If the provider is unable to prove its claim at any point 
during the appeals process, CMS may resume recovering overpayments.39 
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in In 
re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC,40 the healthcare entity must follow CMS’s 
administrative review process before courts are allowed to review the 
appropriateness of CMS’s recovery efforts, even for entities in bankruptcy.41 
CMS only allows limited exceptions for entities who file for bankruptcy.42 
 
 32 42 C.F.R. § 413.60 (2017); ABI, supra note 2, at 15. 
 33 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Financial Management Manual, Ch. 3, § 20.1, 
CMS.GOV (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/ 
fin106c03.pdf. 
 34 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Overpayment Fact Sheet, CMS.GOV (Oct. 
2016), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/ 
downloads/OverpaymentBrochure508-09.pdf. 
 35 Id.  
 36 Id.  
 37 Id.  
 38 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Parts A & B Appeals Process Fact Sheet, 
CMS.GOV (May 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/ 
MLNProducts/Downloads/MedicareAppealsProcess.pdf. 
 39 Id.  
 40 In re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC, 828 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 41 Id. at 1314. 
 42 See Medicare Financial Management Manual, supra note 33, at Ch. 3, § 140. 
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When a healthcare entity files for bankruptcy, CMS continues to assert its 
power to recover overpayments for reimbursements made prior to bankruptcy.43 
Healthcare entities have argued that certain provisions of the Code prohibit 
CMS’s recovery actions after the entity has filed for bankruptcy.44 Such 
healthcare entities are willing to fight the government over their Medicare 
payments because receiving those payments could be the difference between 
surviving the bankruptcy process or being forced to close its doors. 
B. Bankruptcy Code 
Though healthcare is a unique industry consisting of both for-profit and non-
profit organizations, the majority of these entities file for bankruptcy under 
chapter 11.45 Chapter 11 allows the debtor to continue operating the business 
while developing a plan to reorganize and rehabilitate it.46 As a general principle, 
bankruptcy seeks to provide collective creditor relief through staying individual 
creditor actions.47 Section 362 of the Code provides that filing a petition for 
bankruptcy triggers the automatic stay.48 The automatic stay “gives [the] 
bankrupt a breathing spell from creditors by stopping all collection efforts, all 
harassment, and all foreclosure actions.”49 It also serves the purpose of 
“permit[ting] [the] bankrupt to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan or 
simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove [it] into bankruptcy.”50  
Section 362(a) stays all collection efforts, including “the setoff of any debt 
owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this 
title against any claim against the debtor.”51 Setoff is further discussed under 
§ 553 of the Code.52 Setoff is defined as “any right of a creditor to offset a mutual 
debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement 
of the bankruptcy case against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the bankruptcy case.”53 Under § 553, 
 
 43 See, e.g., In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1070; In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 372 F.3d at 3. 
 44 6 NORTON, supra note 26. 
 45 Nancy A. Peterman, Introduction, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000). 
 46 5 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L NORTON III, NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. § 91:1 (3d ed. 
2017). 
 47 Id. 
 48 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) 2012. 
 49 Mar. Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 50 Id.  
 51 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (2012). 
 52 Id. § 553. 
 53 5 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L NORTON III, NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. DICT. OF BANKR. 
TERMS § S90 (3d ed. 2017). 
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creditors are allowed to offset debts, subject to the limitations given in §§ 553, 
362, and 363.54 Because the automatic stay limits creditors’ setoff rights, 
creditors must seek relief from the automatic stay through the bankruptcy courts 
before asserting these rights.55 
Though setoff efforts are not exempt from the automatic stay, subsection (b) 
of 11 U.S.C. § 362 discusses certain exceptions to the automatic stay.56 
Specifically, § 362(b)(4) provides an exception for actions by a government unit 
or organization enforcing its police or regulatory power.57 This exception applies 
to government agencies like CMS, but courts have concluded that it does not 
apply when the government agency is seeking to enforce contractual rights, such 
as those based on obligations under the Medicare provider agreements.58 
According to legislative history, this exception should only apply “where a 
governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, 
environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such law.”59 In 
University Medical Center v. Sullivan,60 where HHS withheld post-petition 
Medicare payments from a bankrupt hospital because of past overpayments, the 
Third Circuit concluded that withholding Medicare payments was not within 
HHS’s regulatory power, and these actions were not exempt from the automatic 
stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).61  
Additionally, in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), Congress amended § 362(b) to include an additional 
exception for the Secretary of HHS for actions excluding debtors from Medicare 
and other federal healthcare programs.62 This provision was specifically enacted 
to combat Medicare fraud by providers.63 Based on the language and underlying 
legislative history of this exception, it can be understood to only apply to 
decisions on whether to terminate provider agreements for fraudulent reasons or 
penalties, but courts have not applied this exception for actions to recover 
 
 54 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012). 
 55 United States ex. rel. I.R.S. v. Norton, 717 F.2d 767, 771 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 56 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (2012). 
 57 Id. § 362(b)(4). 
 58 See In re Corporacion de Servicios Medicos Hospitalarios de Fajardo, 805 F.2d 440, 445 (1st Cir. 
1986); In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1075 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 59 In re Corporacion de Servicios Medicos Hospitalarios de Fajardo, 805 F.2d at 445 (citing H.R.Rep. 
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1977)). 
 60 In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d 1065. 
 61 In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1075. 
 62 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(28) (2012). 
 63 143 Cong. Rec. E1739-02 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1997) (statement of Rep. Stark). 
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overpayments. Even with these changes to § 362 of the Code, none of them have 
been sufficient to clear up the specific issue healthcare entities face when CMS 
seeks to elude the automatic stay to recover overpayments. 
C. Equitable Doctrine of Recoupment 
As an alternative means of offsetting debt, courts have established the 
equitable doctrine of recoupment.64 Recoupment is defined as “[a] counterclaim 
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the one on which the original 
action is based.”65 While recoupment is not a doctrine solely limited to 
bankruptcy cases,66 it allows creditors within the bankruptcy context to assert 
certain mutual claims that would not be allowed through setoff because of its 
statutory limitations.67 Courts allow recoupment when the setoff limitations 
would lead to inequitable results.68 A court may also allow a claim for 
recoupment if the creditor’s claim arises from the same transaction as a debtor’s 
claim because the creditor’s claim can then be seen as a counterclaim or defense 
rather than its own, separate debt obligation.69 This is evidenced by the 
allowances in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure liberalized the process of 
asserting counterclaims,70 those changes contributed to some confusion around 
recoupment. Recoupment seems to fall under the definition of a compulsory 
counterclaim that the party must plead or waive because the claim would be of 
the same subject matter as the other party’s claim.71 In contrast, setoff, which 
arises from a different transaction, would fall under the definition of a 
permissive counterclaim and is not required to be plead in the party’s answer.72 
A setoff is limited by the automatic stay, but recoupment is not subject to this 
 
 64 See United States ex. rel. U.S. Postal Service v. Dewey Freight System, Inc., 31 F.3d 620, 622–23 (8th 
Cir. 1994). 
 65 Recoupment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 66 Dewey Freight System, Inc., 31 F.3d at 622. 
 67 ROBERT E. GINSBERG, ROBERT D. MARTIN & SUSAN KELLEY, GINSBERG & MARTIN ON BANKR. § 8.07 
(5th ed. 2016). 
 68 See id. 
 69 See Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 70 Craig H. Averch & Blake L. Berryman, Getting Out of the Code: When Equitable Remedies Obtain 
Priority over General Unsecured Claims, 5 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 285, 290 (1996). 
 71 See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a). 
 72 See In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, Inc., 141 F.2d 864, 869 (3d Cir. 1944). 
GUICE_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2 12/21/2017 2:03 PM 
136 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
limitation.73 Based on the courts’ discretion, recoupment has been allowed and 
rejected in various cases.74 
The primary limitation on recoupment is the requirement that the claims 
arise from the same transaction.75 If the claims arise out of the same transaction, 
the creditor’s claims are considered recoupments, and the creditor’s post-
petition actions are not stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362.76 If the claims arise from 
separate transactions, actions to recover debt are considered setoff and are stayed 
under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) unless relief is granted by a bankruptcy court.77 
Since there is no clear indicator of which claims are within the same transaction, 
debtors and creditors have brought this issue to the courts.  
D. Judicial Approaches to the “Same Transactions” Test 
Various circuits have decided that the most important issue in determining 
whether post-petition recovery efforts for certain claims will be considered 
setoff or recoupment is whether the claims are part of the same transaction, but 
these courts have not settled on one test for determining what qualifies as a single 
transaction.78 Only five circuits have spoken to this issue, and decisions by 
bankruptcy and district courts have varied.79 To determine whether the claims 
are part of the same transaction, courts have come up with two tests: the single 
integrated transaction test and the logical relationship test.80 
1. Single Integrated Transaction Test 
The single integrated transaction test provides a narrow approach for 
determining what constitutes a single transaction.81 This approach states that 
“both debts must arise out of a single integrated transaction so that it would be 
inequitable for the debtor to enjoy the benefits of that transaction without also 
 
 73 In re LaPierre, 180 B.R. at 100. 
 74 See, e.g., In re Ross, 104 B.R. 171, 173–74 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (allowing government agency to recoup 
prepetition overpayments of unemployment benefits from debtor); Lee, 739 F.2d at 876 (concluding that 
government could not recoup prepetition overpayments of Social Security benefits because debt was subject to 
limits on setoff). 
 75 GINSBERG, supra note 67.  
 76 Palmer, supra note 6, at 8. 
 77 See Berkowitz, supra note 15. 
 78 See, e.g., In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d at 105; In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 372 F.3d 
at 4; In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d at 1011; United States v. Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d 
390; In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1079; see also 6 WILLIAM, supra note 26. 
 79 6 WILLIAM, supra note 26, at § 119:8. 
 80 See Berkowitz, supra note 15. 
 81 See In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1081. 
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meeting its obligations.”82 The Third Circuit discussed this approach in 
University Medical Center v. Sullivan, where HHS withheld Medicare 
reimbursements from a hospital after discovering previous overpayments.83 
There, University Medical Center (“UMC”) filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy and 
was sent a demand letter from a fiscal intermediary informing the hospital of 
Medicare overpayments from three years prior.84 As a result, HHS began 
withholding payments from UMC.85 Although UMC attempted to enter into a 
repayment plan, their efforts ultimately failed, and HHS resumed withholding 
the entire amount of UMC’s Medicare reimbursements, forcing the hospital to 
close.86  
Prior to the Third Circuit’s holding, the bankruptcy court found for UMC 
based on § 525(a) of the Code,87 stating that the government was unlawfully 
discriminating against the debtor by conditioning future payments on repayment 
of the past overpayments.88 In its decision, the bankruptcy court did not state 
any distinctions between recoupment and setoff, but it concluded that the 
government’s actions were a violation of the automatic stay.89 HHS appealed, 
and the district court affirmed but based on a different rationale. The district 
court rejected the bankruptcy court’s finding of discrimination,90 and instead 
focused on the recoupment argument made by HHS. After assessing whether the 
prepetition overpayment and post-petition payment arose from the same 
transaction, the district court ruled that the two were separate transactions.91 The 
district court’s decision pointed out that the provider agreement did not enable 
HHS to enter into one transaction for recoupment purposes. The court also made 
sure to examine the reconciliation process and other equitable concerns.92 
Following that decision, both parties asked the district court to reconsider the 
case, and the district court reaffirmed its decision for UMC.93 Though the district 
court only reconfirmed its previous decision, it issued another opinion clarifying 
its rationale. The district court explained the policy considerations behind 
 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 1070. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2012).  
 88 Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re Univ. Med. Ctr.), 93 B.R. 412, 416 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re Univ. Med. Ctr.), 122 B.R. 919, 924 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
 91 Id. at 929. 
 92 Id. at 930 (distinguishing In re B & L Oil Co., 782 F.2d 155 (10th Cir. 1986), where the equitable 
concern was that the creditor mistakenly made a payment that was not required by a contract). 
 93 Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re Univ. Med. Ctr.), 125 B.R. 121, 123 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
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disallowing HHS to recoup those overpayments and force hospitals into 
bankruptcy or closure.94 The court also discussed the provider agreements being 
an executory agreement subject to assumption.95 
Even after three decisions, both parties appealed to the Third Circuit. The 
Third Circuit, applying its strict single integrated transaction test, concluded that 
HHS’s post-petition recovery actions were setoff efforts and therefore a 
violation of the automatic stay.96 The Third Circuit explained that the ongoing 
relationship between HHS and its Medicare providers did not sufficiently 
support a finding that the payments and overpayment recovery efforts were one 
transaction.97 After reviewing Medicare’s statutes and regulations, the Third 
Circuit found Medicare’s reconciliation process, which provided for an annual 
audit to reconcile the debts, supportive to show that overpayments from a 
payment three years prior were not within the same transaction, and recoupment 
was not appropriate.98 
By using the single integrated transaction test, the Third Circuit stood behind 
its previously stated belief that the equitable doctrine of recoupment should 
narrowly construe what constitutes a single transaction.99 In a previous Third 
Circuit case on recoupment, Lee v. Schweiker,100 the court articulated the idea 
that “[t]he fact that the same two parties are involved, and that a similar subject 
matter gave rise to both claims, however, does not mean that the two arose from 
the ‘same transaction.’”101 After returning to this same statement in University 
Medical Center, the Third Circuit further explained its rationale for prescribing 
the single integrated transaction test by stating that exceptions to the automatic 
stay based on recoupment should be narrowly construed because the doctrine is 
not stated in the statute.102 The Third Circuit declined to agree that a “mere 
logical relationship” is enough to establish that the claims arose from the same 
transaction.103 
 
 94 See id. at 124 (“Under the Medicare reimbursement scheme, a provider that derives a substantial portion 
of its revenue from Medicare patients might be indebted to HHS, through no fault of its own . . . . To allow HHS 
to recoup this debt by completely withholding interim payments as they accrue, would place the hospital in a 
stranglehold.”). 
 95 Id. 
 96 In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1080. 
 97 Id. at 1081. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See Lee, 739 F.2d at 875 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 100 Lee, 739 F.2d 870.  
 101 Id. at 875. 
 102 In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1081 (citing In re B & L Oil Co., 782 F.2d at 158). 
 103 Id. 
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2. Logical Relationship Test 
A second approach used by courts to determine whether debts fall within the 
same transaction is the logical relationship test. The logical relationship test 
implements the broader approach rejected by the Third Circuit. The test states 
“a ‘transaction’ may include ‘a series of many occurrences, depending not so 
much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical 
relationship.’”104 The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Seventh, 
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have employed this test to generally conclude that post-
petition Medicare payments and prepetition overpayments are within the same 
transaction, allowing the government to recoup these payments without running 
afoul of the automatic stay.105 
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit was the first court 
following University Medical Center to prescribe this alternative to the Third 
Circuit’s test. In United States v. Consumer Health Service of America,106 the 
D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of allowing the government to recover prepetition 
Medicare overpayments from a home healthcare provider within bankruptcy.107 
Prior to reaching the D.C. Circuit, the bankruptcy court ruled against HHS, citing 
to the Third Circuit’s decision in University Medical Center.108  
In the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, it never defined the “logical relationship test” 
nor explicitly rejected the Third Circuit’s test.109 The D.C. Circuit explained its 
belief that the overpayments and post-petition Medicare payments were part of 
the same transaction based on its understanding of the Medicare statute, which 
the D.C. Circuit felt the Third Circuit neglected to consider carefully.110 The 
D.C. Circuit disagreed with the use of the healthcare entity’s annual audit as an 
indicator because, in its view, timing is irrelevant to the determination.111  
The court reasoned that even under the Third Circuit’s strict test, the 
Medicare payments should be considered part of the same transaction because 
the statute describes the Medicare reimbursements as one payment subject to 
 
 104 In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d at 1013 (quoting Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 
(1926)). 
 105 See In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d at 104; In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d at 1013; Consumer 
Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d at 395. 
 106 Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d 390. 
 107 Id. at 396.  
 108 United States v. Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 171 B.R. 917, 922 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1994). 
 109 See Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 110 See Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d at 394; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395g (2012). 
 111 Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d at 395. 
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“necessary” deductions.112 Since the statute stated that the debtor could be paid 
for its post-petition services minus “necessary” adjustments, the D.C. Circuit 
sought to determine what Congress intended those adjustments to include.113 
The D.C. Circuit recognized that “necessary” deductions could have meant those 
sufficient to repay HHS for some overpayments without forcing the debtor into 
financial difficulties.114 However, without finding any guidance from Congress, 
the D.C. Circuit remanded to the bankruptcy court to determine the amount that 
should be paid to Consumer Health.115 The D.C. Circuit’s statements on what 
are considered “necessary” deductions brought even more ambiguity to the 
confusing issue of recoupment of overpayments by rejecting HHS’s 
interpretation of the term only to leave the lower courts to come up with their 
own interpretation. 
Following Consumer Health Services, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit joined the D.C. Circuit in embracing the broader approach 
to defining whether Medicare payments were within a single transaction. In In 
re TLC Hospitals, Inc., the Ninth Circuit articulated its standard for what is now 
known as the logical relationship test.116 In In re TLC Hospitals, Inc., HHS 
attempted to deduct prepetition overpayments from post-petition 
underpayments.117 At the bankruptcy court, the court allowed HHS to offset its 
prepetition overpayments from the underpayments it owed the hospital but not 
from the post-petition payments.118 The district court reversed, allowing HHS to 
recover its prepetition overpayments from post-petition reimbursement 
payments under recoupment.119 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, recognizing that 
recovery of prepetition overpayments would not be allowed under the setoff 
provisions of the Code but concluded that the overpayments and underpayments 
could be recouped because they were within the “same transaction.”120 The 
Ninth Circuit took a similar approach as the D.C. Circuit by reading the 
Medicare statute and regulations as creating a billing system of payments that 
“logically relate” to the same transaction.121 The Ninth Circuit also attempted to 
make clear that this logical relationship test should be subject to some limits and 
 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 396. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d 1008. 
 117 Id. at 1010. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Sims v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 225 B.R. 709, 715 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 
 120 In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d at 1011. 
 121 Id. at 1012. 
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not so loosely applied that it would expand to cover “multiple occurrences in 
any continuous commercial relationship.”122  
In In re TLC Hospitals, Inc., the Ninth Circuit recognized a split between the 
circuits by clearly stating that it joined the D.C. Circuit in its opinion and 
disagreed with the Third Circuit.123 Similarly, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit’s decisions in In re Holyoke Nursing Home124 and 
In re Slater Health Center125 confirmed the First Circuit’s choice to follow the 
D.C. and Ninth Circuit’s approach to interpreting “same transaction” under the 
recoupment doctrine. In Holyoke, the Health Care Financing Administration 
(“HCFA”)126 began withholding Medicare payments from Holyoke Nursing 
Home after it filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.127 Holyoke commenced an 
adversary proceeding against HCFA for violating the automatic stay.128 The 
bankruptcy court and district court both found that HCFA’s actions were 
permissible based on recoupment.129  
A year later in Slater, the First Circuit again faced a case where Medicare 
began withholding a portion of the bankrupt nursing home’s payments to recover 
prepetition overpayments.130 In both Holyoke and Slater, the First Circuit held 
that Medicare overpayments may be recouped without violating the automatic 
stay.131 In Slater, the First Circuit cited to its decision in Holyoke as controlling 
precedent and stated its decision to follow other circuits, such as the D.C. Circuit 
and Ninth Circuit, in holding that recoupment is permissible in Medicare 
overpayment cases.132 In Slater and Holyoke, the First Circuit explained that the 
payments were part of a single transaction based on the continuous relationship 
established by the Medicare provider agreements.133 
The circuits that have addressed this issue seem to focus their decisions on 
whether the government’s recovery actions will be stayed around the doctrines 
 
 122 Id. 
 123 See id. at 1013. 
 124 In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 372 F.3d 1. 
 125 In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d at 105. 
 126 The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) was the prior title of the Department of Health and 
Human Services’ (HHS) Medicare division. Health Care Finance Administration, FEDERAL REGISTER, 
https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/health-care-finance-administration (last visited Nov. 1, 2017). 
 127 In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 372 F.3d at 2. 
 128 Id. at 3. 
 129 Id. 
 130 In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d at 99. 
 131 See In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 372 F.3d at 4; In re Slater Health Center, Inc., 398 F.3d at 105. 
 132 In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d at 103.  
 133 In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 372 F.3d at 4; In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d at 105.  
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of setoff and recoupment. Courts attempt to employ recoupment as an equitable 
means of allowing creditors to recover counterclaims.134 However, few courts 
consider that setoff and recoupment essentially allow certain creditors to rise 
above others, thereby disrupting bankruptcy’s goal of equal distribution to 
creditors.135 The unique nature of healthcare entities in bankruptcy demands that 
courts reconsider this doctrine.  
II. DISCUSSION  
This Comment will argue that courts should follow the minority approach in 
University Medical Center v. Sullivan when determining whether government 
actions to recover Medicare overpayments are subject to the automatic stay. 
Following the single integrated transaction test to determine whether Medicare 
payments and overpayments fall within the same transaction properly limits the 
non-statutory doctrine of recoupment. This test also allows courts to consider 
the unique nature of bankruptcy cases for healthcare entities and treats the 
government equal to any other creditor when seeking to recover contractual 
obligations. 
A. Limitations on Recoupment 
In University Medical Center, the court defines “recoupment” as “the setting 
up of a demand arising from the same transaction as the plaintiff’s claim or cause 
of action, strictly for the purpose of abatement or reduction of such claim.”136 
Recoupment is not a doctrine discussed in the Code, but courts recognize it as 
an equitable alternative to setoff.137 Recoupment began as a doctrine that 
allowed parties to bring separate claims but adjudicate them together.138 This 
doctrine held importance in many contexts, but modernly it is most important in 
bankruptcy law.139  
As discussed above, in bankruptcy, courts make determinations about 
whether claims fall within the doctrine of recoupment by determining whether 
 
 134 See GINSBERG, supra note 67, at § 8.07. 
 135 See Lee, 739 F.2d at 875. 
 136 In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1079 (citing 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 553.03, at 553-15-17 (L. 
King, ed. 15th ed. 1991). 
 137 See Lee, 739 F.2d at 875 (stating that recoupment may be utilized when applying setoff limitations 
would be inequitable). 
 138 In re B & L Oil Co., 782 F.2d at 157 (describing the original doctrine of recoupment as “an equitable 
rule of joinder.”). 
 139 See, e.g., id. 
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they arise from the same transaction.140 While there are statutory limitations on 
setoff,141 the “same transaction” requirement seems to be the only limitation 
recognized for recoupment.142 Because equitable recoupment may allow 
creditors to circumvent the automatic stay, the doctrine must be narrowly 
construed to prevent abuse.143 It has been argued that recoupment, like setoff, 
violates bankruptcy’s goal of fair and equal treatment of creditors,144 but courts 
seem to continue allowing recoupment because of equity.145 
1. Ambiguity of “Same Transaction” 
The ambiguity around recoupment in bankruptcy contexts arises from a lack 
of clarity on what constitutes the “same transaction.” The definition of setoff 
discusses “mutual debts,” but these debts arise from different transactions.146 On 
the other hand, the definition of recoupment requires that the claims arise from 
the “same transaction.”147 Because of the similarities between setoff and 
recoupment, courts may not specifically distinguish which of these remedies the 
party is entitled to outside of the bankruptcy context.148 Often courts discuss 
applying a test to determine whether claims arise from the same transaction, but 
never state how such a test operates.149 The seemingly simple distinction 
between the doctrines has sparked debate over the definition of the phrase “same 
transaction” to determine when recoupment is applicable in bankruptcy cases.150  
Prior to a specific statement of the doctrine of recoupment, the Supreme 
Court discussed the definition of “transaction” in the context of counterclaims 
in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange.151 The Supreme Court stated that 
transaction has a flexible meaning and that “[i]t may comprehend a series of 
many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their 
 
 140 See Palmer, supra note 6, at 8. 
 141 See 11 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 142 GINSBERG, supra note 67, at § 8.07. 
 143 James H. Wynn, Freeze and Recoupment: Methods for Circumventing the Automatic Stay?, 5 BANKR. 
DEV. J. 85, 103 (1988). 
 144 See Cty. of Orange v. Cty. of Orange (In re Cty. of Orange), 183 B.R. 609, 615 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1995). 
 145 See BNY Fin. Corp. v. Masterwear Corp. (In re Masterwear Corp.), 229 B.R. 301, 311 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 146 See David G. Epstein & Jonathan A. Nockels, Recoupment: Apples, Oranges and Fruit Basket 
Turnover, 58 SMU L. REV. 51, 54 (2005). 
 147 See generally id. 
 148 Id. at 54. 
 149 See, e.g., Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 481, 488 (5th Cir. 1967). 
 150 GINSBERG, supra note 67, at § 8.07. 
 151 Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926). 
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connection as upon their logical relationship.”152 With the Court only addressing 
the definition of “transaction” in the context of general counterclaims and not 
“same transaction” for the purpose of recoupment, it is unclear whether the same 
definition should apply to a more specific doctrine like recoupment.153 
In one of the earlier cases to mention recoupment, Bull v. United States,154 
the Supreme Court gave a similarly vague definition of recoupment.155 The 
Court stated recoupment as “a defense arising out of some feature of the 
transaction upon which the plaintiff’s action is grounded.”156 In a later Supreme 
Court case discussing recoupment of a tax claim, the Court described a single 
transaction for tax cases as “the taxable event claimed upon and the one 
considered in recoupment.”157 Though the Court gives an unclear definition of 
“single transaction,” it goes on to criticize the lower court for its broad 
application of recoupment.158 The Court stated that the same transaction 
requirement should be narrowly construed and limited recoupment in tax cases 
to situations similar to the facts in Bull.159 The Second Circuit later stated that 
recoupment should be even further limited in bankruptcy cases because of its 
tendency to clash with bankruptcy’s goal of providing equal treatment for 
creditors.160  
The first time recoupment was applied in conjunction with bankruptcy law 
was in Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan.161 In Stanolind Oil & Gas, the district 
court addressed a bankrupt oil company in an involuntary proceeding.162 The 
bankruptcy proceedings involved a number of mineral leases on land in the 
company’s estate, but the initial trustee found that these leases were unsalable.163 
The estate was closed, but the debtor did not receive a discharge.164 Later, the 
bankrupt company discovered oil on the land under these leases, and the 
bankruptcy proceedings were reopened. The debtor had transferred a portion of 
the lease to Stanolind, and Stanolind sought to stop the trustee from obtaining 
 
 152 Id. 
 153 Epstein, supra note 146, at 64–65.  
 154 Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935). 
 155 See id. at 262. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Rothensies v. Elec. Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 299 (1946). 
 158 Id. at 301. 
 159 Id. at 300–01. 
 160 See N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. McMahon (In re McMahon), 129 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 161 Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan, 92 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1937). 
 162 Id. at 29. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 30. 
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possession of these leases and recovery of expenses Stanolind incurred from 
developing the lease by arguing that the property had been abandoned.165  
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with Stanolind’s abandonment argument but 
agreed that Stanolind may offset their expenses against the value of the oil.166 
The Fifth Circuit stated that the reimbursements Stanolind sought were a debt 
due to the estate, and by seeking these expenses from the proceeds of the leases 
and oil, Stanolind had a right to offset those debts.167 The Fifth Circuit found 
these actions permissible under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 through the 
equitable doctrines of setoff and recoupment.168 Once again, instead of 
explaining each doctrine, the court stated setoff and recoupment as one doctrine 
that courts may utilize to further equitable principles in bankruptcy cases.169 The 
Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Stanolind set a tone for other decisions that failed to 
distinguish or set a standard for setoff and recoupment as separate doctrines. 
Some courts and commentators argue that recoupment can be reconciled 
with bankruptcy goals because the property the creditor seeks is not property of 
the estate due to someone else holding an interest in the property.170 The Code 
helps to resolve this ambiguity through its clear definitions of “claim” and 
“property of the estate.” The Code defines “claim” as a “(A) right to payment” 
or “(B) right to an equitable remedy.”171 Under § 541 of the Code, “property of 
the estate” is described as “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in 
property as of the commencement of the case.”172 Section 541 also makes clear 
that “any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of 
the case” is also property of the estate.173 This section was included to make 
clear that the debtor is still entitled to payment or benefits for the property and 
services a debtor renders during the time after the bankruptcy case is 
commenced.174 A decision by a New York bankruptcy court also confirmed the 
 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 31–32. 
 167 Id. at 32. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 See In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, Inc., 141 F.2d at 869; In re Career Consultants, Inc., 84 B.R. 419, 
426 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988); Epstein, supra note 146, at 75. 
 171 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2012). 
 172 Id. § 541(a)(1). 
 173 Id. § 541(a)(7). 
 174 See Peter R. Roest, Recovery of Medicare and Medicaid Overpayments in Bankruptcy, 10 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 1, 7 (2001). 
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idea that a right to recover an overpayment could be considered a 
“dischargeable, contingent claim.”175  
No one argues that setoff claims are not an attempt by the creditor to satisfy 
a claim by obtaining property of the estate, which is covered by the automatic 
stay.176 Since recoupment is such a similar doctrine, only distinguished by 
whether the claims are from the same transaction, that minor difference should 
not negate the claim as an equitable interest in the debtor’s property. Though 
provisions of the Code speak to setoff and similar definitions, it does not change 
that recoupment is not mentioned in the Code, and the non-statutory doctrine 
must be interpreted by combining various sources. 
2. Interpreting a Non-Statutory Doctrine 
When considering an ambiguous term within a statute, courts may typically 
consider congressional intent to determine its meaning.177 Unlike setoff, 
recoupment is not addressed in the bankruptcy statute, and courts do not have 
congressional guidance on this doctrine. While recoupment was discussed in the 
bankruptcy context as early as the 1930s,178 Congress did not include 
recoupment in the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, or the BAPCPA.179 The 
Bankruptcy Code of 1898 solely discussed “set-off” and did not mention 
recoupment.180 In describing setoff, § 68 stated that “[i]n all cases of mutual 
debts or mutual credits between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the 
account shall be stated and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the 
balance only shall be allowed or paid.”181 As the Fifth Circuit stated in Stanolind 
when interpreting this provision, setoff was viewed as a privilege based on the 
discretion of the court depending on equitable principles,182 but that was the only 
restriction on the provision. In the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Congress did not 
limit setoff as later statutes would, and courts did not see a need to provide other 
equitable principles to supplement this privilege.  
 
 175 Kings Terrace Nursing Home v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. (In re Kings Terrace Nursing Home), 1995 
Bankr. LEXIS 157, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1995), aff’d, 184 B.R. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 176 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2012). 
 177 See The Honorable Thomas F. Waldron, Neil M. Berman, Principled Principles of Statutory 
Interpretation: A Judicial Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 214–15 (2007). 
 178 See Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 92 F.2d 28. 
 179 Epstein, supra note 146, at 63. 
 180 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 68, 30 Stat. 544, 565 (repealed 1978) (superseded by 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–
1532). 
 181 Id. 
 182 Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 92 F.2d at 32. 
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The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 altered ideas about setoff by stating in § 553 
that setoff is a right, not solely a privilege.183 Section 553 does not mention 
recoupment. The right of setoff described in this section applied to mutual debts 
that arose before the bankruptcy case commenced, and the Code does not 
mention a difference between “mutual debts” and those that arise from the “same 
transaction.”184 The Code also changed the previous law on setoff by including 
a provision discussing it in § 362. Currently, § 362 places a limitation on the 
right of setoff while the automatic stay is in place, but it does not mention the 
possibility of subverting this limitation by utilizing recoupment instead.185 There 
was also no mention of recoupment in the Code’s legislative history to guide 
courts.186 Even when Congress amended the Code in 2005 through the 
BAPCPA, there was no amendment that addressed recoupment. Since Congress 
did not codify recoupment when it amended the Code, courts could conclude 
that Congress intended to allow courts to prescribe recoupment’s parameters. 
However, courts must also be aware of the idea that the non-statutory doctrines 
must be narrowly construed with provisions of the Code.187  
The bankruptcy system is known as a statutory system that prescribes clear 
and standard rules for bankruptcy proceedings, but courts also have jurisdiction 
in some cases to protect equity. These two ideas can clash when attempting to 
provide some debtors with more flexible tools for reorganization than the Code 
strictly allows.188 By allowing broad judicial discretion for non-statutory 
doctrines, it becomes a separation of powers issue because the unelected 
judiciary is changing the laws made by the elected legislature.189 While all 
judicial activism cannot be considered a violation of separation of powers, 
judicial interpretation of non-statutory doctrines should, at least, be narrowly 
limited to preserve the goals of the bankruptcy process.190 
 
 183 Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, § 553 (1978); see also 11 U.S.C. § 553 
(2012).  
 184 See 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1978). The “same transaction” distinction for debts arose from the common law, 
not statute. See Lee, 739 F.2d at 875. 
 185 See Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, § 362 (1978); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362 
(2012).  
 186 See H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977); 151 Cong. Rec. S1726-01 (2005). 
 187 See In re McMahon, 129 F.3d at 97; In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1081. 
 188 See Adam J. Levitin, Toward A Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a 
Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (2006). 
 189 See id. at 15. 
 190 Contra id. at 4 (advocating for broader judicial discretion to create a federal common law that expands 
on the Code). 
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Even if courts determine that recoupment is a separate equitable doctrine 
from setoff, there may be cause for distinguishing recoupment’s use in 
bankruptcy cases.191 In In re Malinowski,192 the Second Circuit seemed to imply 
that recoupment should be applied differently in bankruptcy cases than in other 
types of cases to protect bankruptcy’s goal of equal distribution among 
creditors.193 In that case, the New York Department of Labor withheld 
unemployment insurance benefits from a debtor who filed bankruptcy to recover 
prepetition overpayments of unemployment benefits.194 After the debtor filed 
for bankruptcy, the Department of Labor determined the debtor was eligible for 
benefits, but withheld those benefits to recover payments that had previously 
been overpaid to the debtor without filing a claim in the bankruptcy case or 
seeking relief from the automatic stay.195  
While the bankruptcy court and district court held that the Department’s 
actions were permissible under recoupment, the Second Circuit reversed, 
holding that recoupment could not be allowed because the prepetition payments 
and post-petition payments were not part of the same transaction.196 The Second 
Circuit described setoff according to the Code’s definition, but acknowledged 
that recoupment was not subject to the same limitations as setoff and described 
the doctrine instead as “a defense, the purpose of which is to do justice viewing 
one transaction as a whole.”197  
In defining “transaction,” the Second Circuit rejected the broad definitions 
used by other courts and instead explained that recoupment and “transaction” in 
bankruptcy should be “given a more restricted definition.”198 The court rejected 
the Department’s arguments that there was a contractual relationship that 
allowed it to withhold these payments when the payments came from separate 
periods of unemployment.199 In Malinowski, the Second Circuit presented a 
good argument for limiting the non-statutory doctrine of recoupment in 
bankruptcy cases that focused on providing an equitable remedy based on the 
facts of the case and upholding Congress’s goals for the Code.200 
 
 191 See Epstein, supra note 146, at 64. 
 192 Malinowski v. N.Y. Sate DOL (In re Malinowski), 156 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 193 Id. at 133. 
 194 Id. at 132. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 134–35. 
 197 Id. at 133. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. at 134. 
 200 See id. (holding that the goals behind the Code be maintained to limit recoupment). 
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It remains unclear whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Reiter v. 
Cooper201 did anything to clarify this argument on whether bankruptcy cases for 
recoupment should be treated differently than those outside of bankruptcy. In 
Reiter, the bankruptcy trustee brought an action against the bankrupt company’s 
shipping partner to recover freight shipping undercharges.202 The issue in Reiter 
focused on the procedure for bringing counterclaims and recoupment claims.203 
The Court explained that the debtor can utilize recoupment to satisfy 
counterclaims and used a footnote to inform that recoupment in this case was 
not distinguishable because it was a bankruptcy case.204 This footnote has been 
considered as the Court’s way of rejecting the Second Circuit’s opinion in 
Malinowski regarding treating recoupment differently within bankruptcy.205 
Others argue that the Supreme Court did not explain its reasoning enough to 
come to that conclusion.206 In Reiter, the Supreme Court pointed to Bankruptcy 
Rule 7013207 and its incorporation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13208 for 
support.209 However, the issue with using Bankruptcy Rule 7013 is that the Court 
did not consider the exception in the rule for claims that arise after the entry of 
an order for relief or filing of a petition.210 The exception is supposed to 
distinguish post-petition claims that should not be considered counterclaims 
from the prepetition claims that can.211 Because the Supreme Court did not 
discuss this exception, some argue the opinion left room for distinguishing 
claims within bankruptcy from those outside due to the important distinction 
between prepetition and post-petition claims within bankruptcy proceedings.212 
There is also a possibility that Reiter has no substantive significance for the topic 
of recoupment in bankruptcy. The Court’s statement could have solely been 
about the insignificance of the procedural background of the case, where the 
defendant attempted to assert recoupment as a defense instead of a 
counterclaim.213 What is clear is that the Supreme Court did not go further to 
rule on the definition of “same transaction.” 
 
 201 Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258 (1993). 
 202 Id. at 261. 
 203 See id. (determining that there was an issue of time within the procedure). 
 204 Id. at 265 n.2. 
 205 See In re Malinowski, 156 F.3d at 134 (2d Cir. 1998); Epstein, supra note 146, at 54. 
 206 See Averch, supra note 70, at 300. 
 207 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7013. 
 208 FED. R. CIV. P. 13. 
 209 Reiter, 507 U.S. at 265 n.2. 
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In University Medical Center, the Third Circuit stated that recoupment was 
a non-statutory doctrine that should be narrowly construed.214 Narrowly 
construing recoupment must also be balanced with the pre-Code practices 
doctrine. In Cohen v. de la Cruz,215 the Supreme Court explained the pre-Code 
practices doctrine by stating that the Court does not interpret the Code as 
“erod[ing] past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress 
intended such a departure.”216 The pre-Code practices doctrine represents the 
Court’s belief that Congress legislated the Code knowing certain pre-Code 
practices existed, and Congress could have clearly changed those practices 
through the Code.217 Since Congress only discussed setoff in the Code and not 
recoupment, courts are able to utilize the doctrine for equitable purposes, but 
recoupment should not be expanded too broadly.  
Although the pre-Code practices doctrine may be helpful when determining 
whether Congress intended to displace a non-statutory practice, such as 
recoupment, such an assumption would not prohibit courts from imposing 
limitations on the doctrine. In United States v. Texas,218 the Supreme Court 
stated “[s]tatutes which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a 
presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, 
except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”219 Here, the State of 
Texas asserted that the United States Department of Agriculture attempted to 
recover a debt along with prejudgment interest from the State for loss of food 
stamp coupons.220 The State argued that the Debt Collection Act of 1982 
precluded the federal government from recovering prejudgment interest from 
states.221 The Supreme Court ruled against Texas and held that the common law 
principle of prejudgment interest must still be in place because the statute had 
not spoken directly to abrogating it.222 Some commentators use this case to claim 
that a statute cannot modify any area of common law unless it speaks to it 
directly.223 This idea is then imported to how one analyzes the Code and the 
common law doctrine of recoupment. The issue with using the pre-Code 
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 216 Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. at 221 (1998) (quoting Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 
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practices doctrine in the context of recoupment is that the Code is not seeking to 
abrogate it. The goals of the Code may have implications that limit the doctrine 
of recoupment, but United States v. Texas does not provide any instructions on 
how this type of conflict should be resolved.  
The common law also never discussed the appropriate way to construe a 
common law doctrine whose practical significance is diminishing in the areas it 
was originally intended to be utilized. Recoupment was significant outside of 
bankruptcy for procedural reasons when distinguishing counterclaims from 
defenses.224 Currently, most of those requirements for pleadings are no longer 
useful inside or outside of bankruptcy.225 Recoupment’s lingering significance 
is determining whether a claim will be subject to the automatic stay, but it is not 
clear whether the doctrine was intended for this purpose. In Norwest Bank 
Worthington v. Ahlers,226 the Supreme Court stated that the equitable powers 
bankruptcy courts possess are limited by the provisions in the text of the Code.227 
By using the single integrated transaction test to determine which claims arise 
within the same transaction, courts allow recoupment as a pre-Code practice 
without expanding the doctrine so far that it becomes inequitable in some 
situations.228 
Additionally, limiting recoupment by using the single integrated transaction 
test would not harm these creditors as much as many would like to believe. If a 
court denies a creditor the ability to recoup its debt because the transactions are 
not connected enough to fall within the definition of “same transaction,” the 
creditor will simply have a right to setoff instead of recoupment. Under setoff, 
creditors may realize they do not have immediate access to the claimed property, 
but setoff simply places them in the same or better position than other creditors. 
A creditor’s right to setoff would be stayed under § 362 of the Code but within 
the bankruptcy process, the creditor may be treated like a secured creditor.229 As 
a secured creditor, the creditor may not be able to get their property before 
everyone else, but the creditor does have more say in the chapter 11 plan process 
 
 224 Roest, supra note 174, at 46. 
 225 See id. at 73. 
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than a general unsecured creditor.230 Alternatively, the creditor could petition a 
court for relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d) of the Code.231 
B. Using the Single Integrated Transaction Test in Healthcare Cases 
The minority test, or single integrated transactions test, limits the doctrine of 
recoupment enough to allow equitable relief in appropriate circumstances while 
furthering the public policy goals of bankruptcy and healthcare laws. In contrast, 
the logical relationship test embraced by the majority, which only requires 
claims be connected by a “logical relationship,” expands recoupment too 
broadly.232 Under the logical relationship test, the court in In re TLC Hospitals, 
Inc. admitted that the test could be construed to encompass numerous claims 
solely linked by one commercial relationship.233 The court cautioned against 
allowing the doctrine to expand this far but failed to prescribe any additional 
guidelines to stop this from occurring.234 If recoupment is allowed to expand too 
broadly, the doctrine may displace the Code’s provisions regarding setoff and 
disturb the equality of the chapter 11 process. 
1. Cases from Other Industries 
Alternatively, the single integrated transactions test will not drown out 
recoupment or the goals of bankruptcy, but similar approaches have been used 
in a manner that allows certain debtors the fresh start bankruptcy intends to 
provide them. In In re B & L Oil Co.,235 the Tenth Circuit allowed a buyer to 
recoup overpayments from the payments it owed a supplier prior to 
bankruptcy.236 In this case, the Tenth Circuit stated its belief that recoupment 
should apply in narrow situations, but here, the court found this situation to be 
sufficiently narrow.237 The court in In re B & L Oil Co. dealt with a clear contract 
 
 230 “To obtain confirmation, or ‘cramdown,’ of a [c]hapter 11 plan over the dissent of a secured creditor, 
the debtor generally has to provide for a stream of payments (such as through a promissory note) such that (1) 
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that the parties entered for a product, and the buyer sought to recoup amounts 
from the previous month’s exchange.238 The Tenth Circuit allowed recoupment 
because it believed allowing the debtor to keep those amounts would be unjust 
enrichment.239  
Also, in In re Beeche Systems Corp.,240 a bankruptcy court allowed 
recoupment even after accepting the narrow “single integrated transactions” 
approach.241 In this case, the buyer and seller had a contract prior to the seller 
filing bankruptcy.242 The buyer deducted the amount it owed the seller from the 
amount the seller owed the buyer for repurchasing equipment.243 The bankruptcy 
court allowed recoupment in this situation because it was clear from the terms 
of the contract that each party’s claim was from one transaction regarding the 
same equipment.244 Courts are able to utilize narrow tests, like the single 
integrated transactions test, to determine when recoupment is equitable without 
broadening the doctrine. 
Recoupment in healthcare and the Medicare industry is substantially 
different from these examples because of the contractual relationships. 
Arguably, Medicare provider agreements create contractual relationships 
between the government and the healthcare provider.245 Though a contractual 
relationship could make healthcare cases similar to cases like In re B & L Oil 
Co., the courts that allow recoupment under the logical relationship test based 
their opinions on the Medicare statute language that allows HHS to determine 
payments subject to pre-petition overpayment claims.246 Not only are courts 
unclear on whether the relationship is contractual or statutory, but they also do 
not take into account the nature of the agreements. Medicare provider 
agreements also are unique because CMS does not allow contractual 
negotiations on whether HHS will attempt to recoup from the provider during 
bankruptcy, and if recoupment is not limited in other bankruptcy cases (though 
it should be) the single integrated transaction test should especially be used in 
healthcare cases. 
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2. The Single Integrated Transaction Test is the Best Method for 
Healthcare and Government Cases 
Healthcare entities and their provider agreements with CMS are 
substantively different from commercial contracts. This is because these entities 
are not only involved in providing important health services to the public, but 
Medicare reimbursements are also made based on a prospective payment system 
CMS designed.247 The single integrated transaction test is the best method for 
determining whether Medicare overpayment claims should be considered 
recoupment. In University Medical Center, the Third Circuit did not allow CMS 
to recoup overpayments from a medical provider because the claims arose from 
different transactions for different services and products.248 The Third Circuit 
believed CMS’s overpayment claim was distinct from the reimbursements 
because the overpayments were only within the same transaction as the 
reimbursements in the same year, and CMS could not recoup overpayments from 
reimbursements from the following year.249  
In a previous case decided by the Third Circuit, Lee v. Schweiker, the court 
also denied a government entity the right to recoup pre-petition overpayments.250 
In Lee, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) overpaid elderly benefits to 
an individual, but the individual filed for bankruptcy during the time SSA was 
attempting to recover the overpayments by reducing the individual’s monthly 
benefits.251 The Third Circuit decided that these benefits could not be recouped 
from an individual because they were similar to the individual’s income, unlike 
a claim or contractual right.252 The court held that SSA could keep the payment 
it recouped prior to the individual filing for bankruptcy, but by withholding post-
petition benefits, SSA violated the automatic stay because its actions were not 
recoupment.253 
In University Medical Center, the Third Circuit based its decision on 
whether the Medicare payments and overpayments were within the same 
transaction by examining the Medicare reimbursement process. Medicare’s 
unique reimbursement process for healthcare entities should be considered 
because Medicare established the reimbursement procedures, and courts should 
 
 247 See generally Prospective Payment Systems, supra note 30. 
 248 In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1081. 
 249 Id. at 1081–82. 
 250 See Lee, 739 F.2d at 876. 
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enforce those procedures. Medicare uses cost reporting to help determine the 
amount of Medicare funds the healthcare entity should receive.254 Cost reporting 
requires the healthcare provider to submit a standard CMS cost report form 
annually for each fiscal year.255 The cost report requests various information on 
the facilities’ operations, costs, and financial statement data.256 CMS also gives 
providers certain reporting principles to follow when completing these forms, 
such as requiring use of generally accepted accounting principles, unless an 
alternative policy is given.257  
Medicare specifically requires that cost reporting periods align with the 
facility’s twelve-month fiscal year.258 Medicare holds healthcare entities to these 
policies and their cost reports by only allowing limited amendments to submitted 
reports under certain circumstances.259 When submitting the cost reports, an 
entity’s administrator or chief financial officer must certify that the report is 
accurate and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.260 Then, 
Medicare turns the cost report file over to a Medicare Administrative Contractor 
(“MAC”) to review and audit it.261 CMS tasks various MACs with performing 
audits at the site of the healthcare entity or as a “desk review,” and following the 
audit they must reconcile and settle the reimbursements for the period.262  
The courts in University Medical Center and Lee v. Schweiker made their 
decisions about whether the claims arose out of the same transaction by 
examining the facts and characteristics of the claims presented.263 The single 
integrated transaction test’s narrow interpretation of “same transaction” is 
necessary in bankruptcy cases that involve long, complex transactions, like those 
in healthcare and other cases involving the government. Courts should also 
 
 254 See 42 C.F.R. § 413.20 (2017). 
 255 Id. § 413.20. 
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narrowly construe “same transaction” in cases with government agencies 
because the Bankruptcy Code has already provided special provisions for these 
agencies.264 The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code provides an 
exception for governmental agencies to enforce their police and regulatory 
power.265 When these agencies attempt to enforce contractual rights, they 
remove themselves from the protection of this exception, allowing the courts to 
treat them as all other creditors.266 
The Third Circuit in University Medical Center held that Medicare’s claim 
to recover overpayments did not arise out of the same transaction because of the 
Medicare payment process.267 The court examined the Medicare payment 
system and its process of reconciling its records on an annual basis.268 The Third 
Circuit was able to conduct this type of examination because CMS and other 
regulatory agencies have manuals and rules that prescribe how the agency must 
handle certain actions.269 If agencies are going to promulgate specific 
regulations, the agency must also expect courts to hold them to those standards 
when interpreting other doctrines. 
The Third Circuit’s decision in University Medical Center was focused 
around the audit system, but it also referred to the services from the period when 
the overpayments were made and those services from the post-petition period 
when the reimbursements were held as distinctly different services.270 HHS 
argued the reporting and auditing period centered around the fiscal year was used 
for administrative convenience.271 In Consumer Health Services, the D.C. 
Circuit agreed with that argument and described the audit only as a “snapshot in 
time,”272 but this statement contradicts the strictness of CMS’s policies on cost 
reporting for the fiscal year. By embracing this idea, the D.C. Circuit and other 
courts make the entire term of the Medicare provider agreement one 
transaction.273 This distinction is too broad because CMS’s recoupment actions 
can never be checked by the courts, despite the D.C. Circuit’s statements 
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otherwise.274 When the bankruptcy court examined the Medicare provider 
agreement in University Medical Centers,275 it pointed to the provision that 
stated HHS’s reimbursements were for each eligible patient that the hospital 
treated.276 When the Third Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court’s decision, it 
took into account that each patient may have different services provided to them, 
but HHS chose to keep track of the services rendered within a certain transaction 
through the reporting and auditing procedure. 
C. Effects on Healthcare Entities 
In the healthcare industry, efficient reorganization can have a significant 
effect on public health.277 When healthcare entities are not given the adequate 
resources to reorganize, they may be forced to close their doors to patients.278 
Medicare reimbursements are a necessary tool of reorganization for many 
healthcare providers. Courts and the government should also consider how limits 
placed on recoupment can assist the goals of health law.279 In Lee v. Schweiker, 
the Third Circuit acknowledged the argument that government benefits to 
individuals may warrant a special consideration when deciding whether a 
government agency may recoup overpayments during bankruptcy.280 The single 
integrated transactions test, as used in Lee and University Medical Center, takes 
into account the special circumstances of healthcare and government agency 
cases when determining how broadly the courts should define “same 
transaction.”281 
A unique issue for healthcare entities is their obligation to continue servicing 
a patient once their staff begins treating him.282 Under the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), if a patient enters the 
emergency department of a hospital with an emergency medical condition, the 
hospital is required to at least screen and stabilize the patient.283 EMTALA 
prohibits hospitals from “dumping” patients on other emergency departments 
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for discriminatory reasons, such as race, sexual orientation, or lack of 
insurance.284 Physicians are also prohibited from discontinuing service to their 
patients without going through a proper procedure to terminate the physician-
patient relationship and assist the patient in finding other services.285 Though the 
costs for these services are supposed to be factored into Medicare’s payment 
system, these special obligations could be a reason why in previous years 
Medicare underpayments have totaled over $20 billion.286 
 It seems inequitable that one party may be allowed to recoup payments, but 
the other party cannot discontinue services if the government breaches its 
contractual obligation. After University Medical Center, the Third Circuit’s 
decision could be read broadly enough to allow an entity to enforce a provider 
agreement against the government but not perform its obligations.287 Under 
§ 365 of the Code, an executory contract may be temporarily unenforceable 
against the debtor in the time period before plan confirmation and assumption 
or rejection of the contract.288 In those situations where the debtor could try to 
take advantage of the creditor, creditors are also given a remedy under § 365(d) 
to petition courts to require that the debtor assume or reject the contract.289 There 
may also be other options for debtors attempting to hold the government 
accountable for its actions. In Cosgrove v. Bowen,290 where individuals 
attempted to recover interest for underpaid reimbursements, the Second Circuit 
ruled that HHS acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not adjusting 
reimbursement rates for some physician services, causing underpayments.291 
D. Jurisdictional and Other Potential Issues 
By prescribing such a broad test for determining the definition of “same 
transaction,” the majority approach enables CMS to recoup Medicare 
overpayments from healthcare entities despite the circumstances the entity may 
be facing. CMS then has the right to recoup Medicare overpayments without 
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seeking relief from the automatic stay or coming to the bankruptcy courts.292 
Without the automatic stay as a defense, a healthcare entity’s remedy is limited, 
due to jurisdiction issues, to following through with the Medicare appeals 
process.293 The same jurisdictional issue appeared in University Medical Center 
when the case was brought to the court of appeals.294  
In University Medical Center, HHS asserted that neither the court of appeals, 
district court, or bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to rule on the claims.295 HHS 
argued that those courts did not have jurisdiction to hear claims “arising under 
the Medicare statute prior to exhaustion of administrative remedies” based on 
language in the Medicare statute.296 The Third Circuit found that the 
administrative channels were not exhausted, but it had jurisdiction under the  
Code instead because the claim did not “arise under the Medicare statute.”297 
The Third Circuit interpreted the statute to only implicate a jurisdictional issue 
if the claim was over a disputed final reimbursement determination and if any 
amounts were in dispute, unlike the facts in the case.298 Despite the court’s 
somewhat shaky rationale, other circuits continued to rule on these claims based 
on the same idea that they held jurisdiction.299 Most commentators believe that 
University Medical Center left open whether courts may hear overpayment 
claims prior to the provider exhausting its administrative remedies.300 
Although University Medical Center did not start the confusion around 42 
U.S.C. § 405(h) and its jurisdictional limitations for Medicare case, the Third 
Circuit’s decision did not help clear things up. In 1984, when Congress amended 
42 U.S.C. § 405(h), the amended statute was read to only limit district courts 
from hearing claims arising under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346.301 This 
amendment sparked questions on whether § 405(h) also precluded bankruptcy 
courts from hearing Medicare claims if the party has not exhausted all 
administrative processes.302 Then, in Bodimetric Health Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Life 
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& Cas.,303 a home health agency (“HHA”) brought an action against its fiscal 
intermediary for causing it to lose HHA claims, leading to the loss of a 
substantial amount of funds.304  
The lower court, in Bodimetric Health Servs., Inc., granted the fiscal 
intermediary’s motion to dismiss, but the HHA appealed.305 The Seventh Circuit 
ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) precluded the courts from jurisdiction over an 
action brought by HHA against a fiscal intermediary.306 The court ruled that it 
was precluded from jurisdiction, subject to the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies because “Congress clearly expressed its intent not to alter the 
substantive scope of section 405(h).”307 Here, the Seventh Circuit utilized 
congressional intent to determine the implications of the statute because the 
plain meaning presented some ambiguity,308 but this decision did not do enough 
to clear the ambiguity behind the jurisdictional issue. 
In 2014, the jurisdictional issue reappeared in In re Bayou Shores,309 a case 
in which CMS terminated the provider agreement of a skilled nursing facility 
due to compliance problems.310 The nursing facility later filed bankruptcy, and 
the bankruptcy court stayed CMS’s actions to terminate the provider 
agreement.311 At the bankruptcy court, there were numerous issues raised about 
whether the Medicare provider agreements could be assumed and recovery 
actions stayed. When the jurisdictional issue was raised, the bankruptcy court 
held that it had subject matter jurisdiction, despite the Medicare statute, under 
28 U.S.C. § 1334, which gives bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over “all civil 
proceedings arising under title 11.”312  
By the time the case made its way up to the Eleventh Circuit, it was clear 
that the jurisdictional issue had become more contentious. The Eleventh Circuit 
held that courts do not have jurisdiction over cases regarding CMS and Medicare 
claims before the party has completed the agency’s administrative appeals 
process.313 In Bayou Shores, the Eleventh Circuit explained that claims arising 
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under the Medicare Act are no longer limited to those claims based on monetary 
disputes.314 The Eleventh Circuit based its decision on the language in the 
Medicare statute, without also considering the results to healthcare entities.315 
Restricting a debtor’s access to bankruptcy courts to stop Medicare overpayment 
recovery actions will likely affect healthcare entities in bankruptcy, given that 
healthcare entities have reported that these administrative proceedings can take 
years to complete, which ties up funds needed during reorganization.316 
Healthcare entities do not have many other options, outside of leaving the 
Medicare system, which would also cause the entity’s financial demise. In the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re TLC Hospitals, the Ninth Circuit stated that 
health providers that do not want to be subject to HHS’s recoupment actions 
have the option to not provide Medicare services and leave the system.317 Here, 
it does not seem the court considered the equities and circumstances of the case. 
Medicare payments cover such a large percentage of payments to hospitals that 
many cannot survive without them.318 In 2010, HHS data showed that Medicare 
patients accounted for around thirty-five percent of patients in urban hospitals 
and around forty-five percent of patients in rural hospitals.319 
 The survival of these entities hinges on whether Medicare decides to 
demand repayment of all its overpayments at any particular point in time.320 As 
the district court in University Medical Center pointed out, these providers rely 
on Medicare for support and ultimately find themselves indebted to HHS for 
thousands of dollars at no fault of their own.321 From HHS’s own data, it is 
normal for healthcare providers to rely on Medicare for a large portion of its 
funds,322 but when Medicare makes a mistake, the entity will suffer if Medicare 
decides to demand payments from one of these providers. Without some of these 
necessary tools, the goal of chapter 11 bankruptcy that seeks to allow debtors to 
stay in business while attempting to reorganize will not be met. This means the 
underlying idea that these businesses are better for society alive than dead will 
not be followed for one of the most important industries in the nation. 
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If these providers do not have the resources to reorganize, many of them will 
be forced to close. While new healthcare regulations may prompt some closures, 
hospitals especially needed in rural areas will be harmed the most because more 
of their patients’ services are reimbursed through Medicare.323 One example is 
the Nye Regional Medical Center closure in Tonopah, Nevada.324 The closure 
of this medical center left the residents of this rural area over an hour’s drive 
away from the closest emergency department.325 Without any facilities to handle 
emergency situations, the health of residents may be jeopardized. Similar stories 
were seen throughout the country in 2015, and these closures affect patients, 
employees, and the entire public health.326 
CONCLUSION 
For over ten years, courts have been split on whether government actions 
that seek to recover Medicare overpayments from bankrupt healthcare entities 
will be stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362. Courts have sought to resolve this issue 
by defining recoupment as “[a] counterclaim arising out of the same transaction 
or occurrence as the one on which the original action is based,”327 but this 
definition has only led to further confusion over the phrase “same transaction.” 
Out of the two tests used to determine whether claims arise out of the same 
transaction, the single integrated transaction test is the most suitable for the 
healthcare industry and Medicare claims.  
The single integrated transaction test narrowly construes the doctrine of 
recoupment, which restricts certain creditors from advancing their claim before 
others and disrupts bankruptcy’s goal of providing equal treatment of all 
creditors. The healthcare and Medicare industries are unique and important to 
our nation in providing citizens with efficient, affordable, and widely available 
healthcare resources. CMS should not be able to recover overpayments during 
bankruptcy without seeking relief from the automatic stay. This issue regarding 
Medicare claims must be resolved to provide those healthcare entities in 
bankruptcy with more tools for reorganization.  
Though this issue has long been debated, the need for answers is becoming 
increasingly urgent due to new court decisions on the procedures healthcare 
 
 323 Id. 
 324 Value Healthcare Services, Nye Regional Medical Center Closes, http://valuehealthcareservices.com/ 
education/nye-regional-medical-center-closes/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
 325 Id. 
 326 See, e.g., id. 
 327 Recoupment, supra note 65. 
GUICE_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2 12/21/2017 2:03 PM 
2017] RECOVERY OF MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS 163 
entities must follow to get their claims heard. In In re Bayou Shores SNF, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that a healthcare facility must adjudicate its complaints 
about Medicare through the agency’s administrative process prior to bringing 
the claim to the courts, including bankruptcy courts.328 This means that 
healthcare entities will have a more difficult time getting a court to hear its 
claims before it is too late for the entity to survive.  
By allowing the government agency to jump other creditors in the 
bankruptcy process and restricting courts from reviewing their actions for 
numerous months, it gives HHS too much control. These procedures ignore the 
importance of the automatic stay and giving the debtor the necessary “breathing 
room” to reorganize. Under the ACA, future healthcare plans, and other 
healthcare regulations, assistance from the courts will be needed to achieve the 
legislature’s goal of increasing public health and efficient care.  
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